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 I
Losses and Gains to Developing Countries from the Migration of Educated 
Workers: An Overview of Recent Research, and New Reflections 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper synthesizes and extends recent research on “The New Economics of the 
Brain Drain.” In a unified framework, the paper shows that while recently identified 
adverse repercussions of the brain drain exacerbate the long-recognized negative 
impact of the brain drain, longer-term consequences turn the brain drain into the 
harbinger of powerful gains. These gains have been studied already in recent research, 
or merit attention in future research. 
 
 
Zyski i straty z migracji pracowników wykwalifikowanych dla krajów 
rozwijających się: przegląd najnowszych badań i nowe refleksje 
 
Streszczenie 
Artykuł zawiera syntezę najnowszych badań dotyczących "Nowej ekonomii drenażu 
mózgów" oraz rozszerzenie tej literatury. Autorzy korzystają z jednolitej konstrukcji 
by pokazać, że choć ostatnio zidentyfikowane niekorzystne reperkusje drenażu 
mózgów pogarszają od dawna dostrzegany negatywny wpływ drenażu mózgów, to 
jednak w długim okresie drenaż mózgów jest zapowiedzią znacznych korzyści. 
Niektóre z tych korzyści były już przedmiotem badań, a niektóre zasługują na 
zainteresowanie badaczy w przyszłości. 
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Labor migration has long been a topic of intense interest in population research in 
general and in development economics in particular. The topic has been gaining added 
appeal in the era of globalization. Until recently, the received literature has taken a simple 
view on the consequences of the migration of educated people from developing countries: 
it results in a “brain drain” (for a systematic review see Bhagwati and Wilson 1989). A 
recent and growing literature, notably Stark, Helmenstein, and Prskawetz (1997, 1998), 
Mountford (1997), and Stark and Wang (2002), argues that the brain drain is 
accompanied by a beneficial brain gain. The new writings contend that compared to a 
closed economy, an economy open to migration differs not only in the opportunities 
workers face but also in the structure of the incentives that they confront: higher 
prospective returns to human capital in a foreign country impinge favorably on human 
capital formation decisions at home. 
 
In a set of recent papers (Fan and Stark 2007a, 2007b, 2007c) we synthesize and 
extend the two strands of the received literature, and we analyze both the positive and 
negative impacts of the migration of educated workers in a unified framework. In this 
article we summarize our recent research, and elaborate the further implications of our 
work. 
 
1. In the short run, the negative consequences of the migration of educated 
workers amount to more than a “brain drain” 
 
We extend the received literature of “harmful brain drain” by showing that in the 
short run, international migration can result in “educated unemployment” and in 
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overeducation, as well as in a brain drain. Specifically, and in contrast with the literature 
that views the brain drain as the only negative consequence of international migration of 
educated or skilled workers, we identify three possible negative short-run consequences. 
 
First, consistent with the “traditional” view, migration leads to a reduction in the 
“stock” of better-educated individuals, which in turn reduces the average income in the 
developing country. 
 
Second, since some educated individuals who would otherwise have taken jobs 
are lured into further education only to end up unemployed, output shrinks. Indeed, in a 
number of developing countries, a large fraction of the educated workforce is 
unemployed. For example, in their influential development economics textbook, Gillis et 
al. (1996) allude to the Sri Lankan experience as a striking example, noting that half of 
the country’s new university graduates were unemployed in the 1970s. Also, Mathew 
(1997) reports that in urban Kerala, India in 1983, the unemployment rate of university 
graduates was 11.34 percent for males and 25.69 percent for females, which is much 
higher than the unemployment rate of those who had no education (3.52 percent for 
males, and 1.52 percent for females), and the unemployment rate of those who had only 
primary education (6.73 percent for males, and 8.43 percent for females). More recently, 
Boudarbat (2004) shows that in 2000, the unemployment rate of university graduates in 
Morocco was about four times that of individuals with less than six years of schooling.1 
                                                 
1 There is a fairly large empirical literature that consistently documents such a phenomenon of educated 
unemployment in a number of developing countries. For additional evidence that in developing countries 
the incidence of unemployment is higher amongst the educated see Tenjo (1990) for Colombia, Dickens 
and Lang (1995) for Sri Lanka, and Serneels (2007) for Ethiopia. 
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The phenomenon of educated unemployment in those developing countries contrasts 
sharply with the pattern of unemployment in developed countries. In the latter, the 
unemployment rate and educational attainment are strongly negatively correlated 
(Ashenfelter and Ham, 1979). In Fan and Stark (2007a), we present a model of “educated 
unemployment.” We contend that “educated unemployment” is caused by the prospect of 
international migration, that is, by the possibility of a “brain drain.” In a simple job-
search framework we show that an individual’s reservation wage in the labor market of 
the home country increases with the probability of working abroad. Consequently, 
workers who fail to line up employment abroad are less likely to immerse themselves 
immediately in work in their home country. Instead, they enter unemployment in order to 
engage in a repeated attempt to secure foreign employment. Thus, we provide a new 
explanation for the phenomenon of “educated unemployment” observed in developing 
countries. In Fan and Stark (2007c) we add to Fan and Stark (2007a) by re-examining the 
link between the prospect of migration and unemployment in a fixed-wage framework, 
suggesting that the prospect of migration results in involuntary unemployment in the 
domestic labor market. We argue that a sticky-wage model portrays accurately a setting in 
which, consistent with considerable empirical and policy-related research, a great many 
university graduates compete for relatively few jobs in the public sector where the wage 
rate is fixed. We develop a simple model showing that in a developing country, an 
increase in the probability of working abroad induces more individuals to acquire 
education, which leads to an increase in the labor supply of educated workers in the 
domestic labor market. Due to a sticky wage rate, the demand for labor is constant. We 
show that the increase in the probability of working abroad results then in an increase in 
the unemployment rate of educated workers in the domestic labor market. 
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Third, since the possibility of migration induces individuals in a developing 
country to acquire higher education, when some of these individuals end up remaining in 
the country, the returns to their education could be less than its costs. From their 
perspective, they are overeducated. If the country’s economy cannot “take off,” then these 
individuals’ overeducation is socially inefficient (in the short run). There is an interesting 
literature on “overeducation” which, in labor economics, is defined somewhat differently 
than in our setting. Using American data, Sicherman (1991) shows that overeducation can 
be partly explained by the mobility patterns of educated workers. In our setting, 
overeducation is explained by the migration prospect of educated workers. 
 
In Fan and Stark (2007b) we conduct a simulation exercise showing that the costs 
of the two new negative consequences of migration introduced in our research work, 
namely “educated unemployment” and overeducation, can amount to significant losses 
for the individuals affected, who may constitute a substantial proportion of the educated 
individuals. However, in per capita terms, the cost of the brain drain can be relatively 
small if the proportion of educated individuals in the economy is small. The simulation 
further shows that as the wage gap between the foreign country and the home country 
widens, the average cost of educated unemployment, and that of overeducation, will 
increase too. 
 
2. A brief brush with evidence: educated unemployment and overeducation in 
developing countries 
 
The perception that educated workers are sunk into voluntary unemployment at 
 5
home, awaiting a job offer that is in line with their expectations, has received 
considerable attention in the development literature.2 
 
In policy-related research, it is argued that the strong demand for a higher level 
education and the consequent phenomenon of educated unemployment are caused by 
international migration, which significantly increases the expected returns to education 
relative to the returns in a closed economy. For example, King (1987) who studies the 
brain drain and educated unemployment in the Philippines observes (p. 101): “In the case 
of the Philippines, however, a very high demand for college education has accompanied 
high rates of unemployment and underemployment and generally low real wages. Data on 
immigration ... reflect how the demand for education has been heavily influenced and 
encouraged by expected rates of return from employment in overseas labour markets. The 
horizons of Filipinos have expanded beyond the domestic market because of the 
tremendous number of professionals who found employment, career advancement and 
financial rewards overseas. In a situation where unemployment exists and international 
migration is seen as a form of relief, the decline in unemployment is only temporary, as 
the supply of professionals is increased by higher expected wages. In the long run, 
unemployment may even be aggravated. Government subsidy of the cost of education of 
emigrants, of inexperienced workers who replace them, and of a greater number of 
students wanting to enter the same profession will have to be absorbed by the economy. 
Even where the cost of education is fully paid by the individual, the demand for 
education increases in an occupation where there are already unemployed resources.” 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Blaug (1970), and ILO (1971); Zoctizoum (1980), and Muta (1990) alluded to below; 
and Tenjo (1990), Mathew (1997), and Boudarbat (2004) already referred to above. 
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Tullao (1982) who studies the problem of unemployed nurses in the Philippines 
states (p. 45): “The demand for nursing education in the Philippines is influenced 
significantly by international migration. The private profitability of investing in nursing 
education is greatly increased when the probability of emigration is included in the 
investment calculus. Filipinos would not demand nursing education in the light of low 
wages and limited employment opportunities in the domestic market as reflected in the 
low rate of return to nursing education without migration. These unattractive domestic 
employment prospects, and the cost of education are, however, overpowered by the 
profitability of migration and the wage differential between foreign and domestic market, 
which make the expected rates of return to nursing education significantly higher than the 
returns without migration.” 
 
Muta (1990) who seeks to understand the root causes of educated unemployment 
in Asia, states (p. 23): “Migration of the educated suggests that the demand for education 
has been heavily influenced and encouraged by the expected return from employment in 
overseas labour markets.” 
 
Zoctizoum (1980) studies the problem of unemployment among educated young 
people in the French-speaking developing countries of Africa, which include the Central 
African Republic, Cameroon, the Ivory Coast, Benin, Gabon and Mali. Zoctizoum 
observes that the phenomenon of brain drain occurs in parallel with the phenomenon of 
educated unemployment. Zoctizoum writes (p. 106): “Most States are affected by an 
acute shortage of university graduates and skilled manpower, especially in technical 
occupations. Paradoxically, the ‘brain drain’ is increasing. African technicians, engineers 
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and doctors are therefore numerous in Europe. A survey carried out in France in 1968 
revealed that 6.4 per cent of the total number of workers from Africa and Madagascar 
living in France consisted of persons belonging to the `higher management’ category. 
This proportion was nearly 60 per cent higher than that of French `higher management’ in 
relation to the active French population.” 
 
Finally, an interesting observation is that educated unemployment appears to have 
pervaded developing countries in which the official language is English (such as the 
Philippines, India, and Bangladesh in Asia (Muta)), or French (the former French 
colonies in Africa (Zoctizoum)). Education acquired in these countries is relatively 
readily transferable to the developed world, that is, skilled migration is viable. 
Consequently, these countries have simultaneously experienced a large-scale brain drain 
and educated unemployment. 
 
3. Why is it that in the long run the migration of educated workers is a blessing in 
disguise to developing countries? 
 
As noted in Stark (2004, 2005), a recent growing literature on the “brain gain” has 
shown that when migration is probable, the brain drain script may have to be rewritten. 
For example, Stark and Wang (2002) identified conditions under which enhanced skills 
result in a higher per-capita output in the home country than would have been achieved if 
migration were not possible. This outcome arises (partly) because workers who do not 
end up as migrants work at home. But as they are equipped with the skills acquired in 
response to their probable migration, they are more productive. 
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In Fan and Stark (2007b) we add to this emerging literature by examining a 
framework of a “threshold externality” of human capital, which enables us to analyze the 
negative and positive impacts of migration in different periods, and to make welfare 
comparisons. We demonstrate that in the long run (“one generation down the road”), the 
legacy of a relaxation in migration policy prompts “take-off” of the economy. Drawing on 
studies by Azariadis and Drazen (1990) and Galor and Stark (1994) that link the long-run 
growth in a country’s output with the average level of the country’s human capital, we 
emphasize the role of a “threshold externality” of human capital in economic 
development. (Azariadis and Drazen (1990) and Pritchett (1997) provide evidence in 
support of the assumption of a threshold externality. Fan (2004) offers an explanation for 
the existence of the threshold externality in economic development by showing that a 
poor economy will engage in international trade, which will accelerate its growth, if and 
only if its average level of human capital is sufficiently high.) In a dynamic framework 
we show that the brain drain is accompanied by a “brain gain;” that the ensuing “brain 
gain” can result in a higher average level of human capital in the home country; that the 
higher average level of human capital can prompt “take-off” of the economy; and that the 
“take-off” can bite into the unemployment rate. Thus, we depict a setting in which rather 
than being to blame for human capital drain and output contraction, the migration of 
educated workers is the harbinger of human capital gain and output growth. An analysis 
of the entire dynamics associated with the response of educated workers to the prospect 
of migration therefore raises the intriguing possibility that what at first sight appears to 
constitute a curse is, in fact, a blessing in disguise. Our results are more dramatic than 
those reported in the received literature because in our present framework the prospect of 
migration is taken to entail both depletion of human capital and unemployment of human 
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capital, which stacks the cards more firmly against viewing migration as a catalyst for 
growth. 
 
Our analytical predictions appear to be in line with empirical observations. For 
example, from 1960 to 1980 countries characterized by high rates of migration of skilled 
labor (such as India and Ireland) were among those countries that experienced the lowest 
rates of economic growth (Summers and Heston, 1991). However, since the late 1980s 
(that is, after approximately one generation), both India and Ireland have experienced 
rapid economic growth, which to a large extent has been due to an expansion of their 
skill-intensive information technology sector.3 
 
Specifically, our recent and ongoing research suggests that the “brain gain” can be 
manifested via at least three channels. 
 
First, overeducation can become dynamically efficient (due to the 
intergenerational externality effect of human capital) even though it may be statically 
inefficient. This is because children will tend to be better educated if they have educated 
parents. The importance of parental education to a child’s educational attainment has 
been consistently documented since the well-known Coleman report (Coleman et al., 
1966).4 There are numerous ways in which parents’ education may affect children’s 
educational attainment. For example, Sahota (1978, p. 20) estimates that “about 50 
percent of cognitive development of children occurs by the age of three or four.” Bloom 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Kapur and McHale (2003) on the link between migration and the growth of the IT 
sector in these countries. 
4 For a helpful survey see Hanushek (1996). 
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(1981) estimates that 80 percent of an individual’s potential intelligence is developed by 
age 8. Clearly, as suggested by Osberg (1984), almost all this early conditioning 
environment is created by a child’s parents, and it is in these early years that the basic 
personality traits of a child such as self-confidence and aspiration, which significantly 
affect the child’s future academic performance, are largely shaped. Some evidence (for 
example, Vernon, 1979) suggests that the home environment also affects children’s 
learning efficiency at school. In fact, the empirical literature seems to suggest that the 
effect of parental education is much greater than that of parental expenditure on 
children’s education. For example, based on his exhaustive survey of the existing 
literature, Hanushek (1996, p. 16) concludes that “schools (i.e., expenditure on children’s 
schooling) seemed relatively unimportant in determining student achievement, while 
families were the key element of student success.” Thus, parental education has a strong 
intergenerational (externality) effect. This implies that while overeducation is costly to 
the individuals affected in the current generation, it is a social benefit rather than a social 
waste from a long-term perspective. 
 
Second, even increased “uneducated unemployment” may benefit the long-run 
development of a developing country. Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) show that 
individuals often do not spend enough time in job search. They argue that moderate 
unemployment insurance not only imposes risk sharing, but also increases output. By 
similar logic, the possibility of working abroad makes educated individuals more “picky” 
about domestic jobs. Since the educated individuals who end up at home effectively 
spend more time searching for jobs in the domestic labor market, there will be a better 
match between skills and jobs, which implies that the jobs that are not suitable will be 
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less likely to survive. From a long-term perspective, this further improves the industrial 
structure of the economy. 
 
Third, the prevalence of employment opportunities abroad, where the skill mix 
and production technologies are vastly different from those at origin, could tilt the type of 
education sought in new directions; programming instead of engineering, biochemistry 
instead of law. The possibility that workers will acquire proficiencies in fields for which 
there is little current demand at home is often brought up as a criticism of the recent work 
on the beneficial brain drain: workers acquire skills that, while relevant abroad, may be of 
limited applicability at home. But it is possible, indeed intriguing, to consider turning this 
argument on its head. In general, the technologies in the “developed abroad” are 
inherently more advanced than those in developing countries. When N  individuals 
acquire skills that are usable abroad, and when the probability of migration is 0 1p< < , 
the newly acquired knowledge of the ( )1 p N−  individuals who end up staying at home 
could be the catalyst for technological change at home; such a change is initiated, or 
brought forward, by the presence of know-how that without the prospect of migration 
would have been lacking. This argument may not be exactly Say’s Law, which James 
Mill restated as “supply creates its own demand,” but it is in the spirit of that perception. 
 
To a large extent, the exceptional recent rate of growth of the Indian economy (7.5 
% last year) was made possible, fed, and oiled, by the immense strides in India’s 
Information Technology (IT) sector, and these strides, in turn, partly came about as a 
response to the lure of rewarding IT job opportunities abroad. This aspect of the brain 
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drain could thus have been co-responsible for changing the course of Indian development, 
for tilting the economy away from agriculture and industry towards finance, information 
technology, and services. The brain drain could thus be seen as a catalyst not only for an 
expansion of the Indian economy (as in Fan and Stark, 2007b) but also its redirection - its 
skipping of several rungs in the ladder of technological progress. 
 
As is well recognized, the phenomenal recent economic growth in India differs 
fundamentally from the phenomenal recent, and not so recent, growth in China (9.8% last 
year) in that China’s growth has been a product of its efficient, all-powerful government, 
whereas India’s growth has been largely unplanned. It is not a top-down affair; it is a 
bottom-up spectacle. In the balance sheet of state directives / individual initiatives, the 
inclinations of individuals, and the greater scope for translating these into action, played a 
larger role in India’s growth than in China’s. 
 
India has managed to produce world-class private sector companies: Infosys, 
Ranbaxy, Reliance. Infosys is a consultancy and IT services company with 60,000 
employees; Ranbaxy is a pharmaceutical company with 10,000 employees; and Reliance 
is an information and communication company with 40,000 employees. None of these 
marvels, which so successfully produce for world markets, would have attained this 
status but for the Indian-based supply of IT personnel. And that supply would not exist 
without the prospect of employment overseas. This possibility caused people to acquire 
skills for which the local demand was then slim. Yet their initiative was not muted by 
knowing that with probability ( )1 p−  rewarding employment overseas will not be 
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obtained. When the wage premium of overseas employment was sufficiently high, 
( )1 p−  was not a deterrent. At the time, human capital investments oriented towards 
overseas employment could have been considered a poor fit to the Indian needs; they 
were good for “foreign” work - work in other industries in other countries. From the point 
of view of the Indian economy of the time, they were a waste of human capital. But the 
people who got the “wrong” training were the precursors of the development of 
technologies, sectors, industries, and companies that in themselves were, in many ways, 
of the “foreign type.” They swiftly manned the ranks of the said world-oriented 
companies which not only could not grow while facing bottlenecks of skilled workers, 
but may very well have been conceived specifically to tap into the “miseducated” 
unutilized, or underutilized, pool. It is not (or not merely) that Indians who went abroad 
and returned home with enhanced skills were able to start producing in India as they did 
abroad; but that Indians waiting to work in fields that existed abroad but barely at all at 
home acquired locally the skills that brought “abroad” home. In a way, the failure of 
individuals to export themselves was conducive to the “import” of enterprises that could 
gleefully make use of the freshly-formed talent. 
 
In summary, entrepreneurs assured of an adequate supply of workers trained to 
use advanced technologies could well be enticed to introduce these technologies at home 
once it was clear that the local workforce had become highly skilled. It is as if the brain 
drain, via the dynamic search for a higher level of education and skills it sets in motion, 
serves to loosen the grip of the traditional or obsolete technologies. It could even be 
anticipated that once the new technologies take hold, the returns to human capital within 
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the country will be so raised that the initial “shock” of the brain drain will be replaced by 
a modified and home-based structure of incentives. In general, technological advance in 
developing countries can proceed in two ways: through gradual sequences in existing 
technologies, or by a leapfrog - where new technologies are adopted while skipping over 
revisions of existing technologies. Latterly, India has taken a huge leap into a high-tech 
service economy. Indirectly then, the brain drain could navigate a developing economy 
away from the former technological path onto the latter technological path. And lastly 
(and this could well constitute a fourth manifestation of the brain gain), when the returns 
to human capital at home are rising fast, especially in the wake of the new technologies 
“settling in,” it will not be all that surprising if a “reverse brain drain” is set in motion: 
skilled workers will return home to employ there the skills they have hitherto put to use 
abroad. 
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